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KAUNA v. FLETCHER: ANOTHER
QUALIFICATION OF IMBLER'S
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kalina v. Fletcher,' the Supreme Court addressed whether
the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a
prosecutor from liability for attesting to false facts in an affidavit
supporting the issuance of an arrest warrant.2 A unanimous
Court held that a prosecutor is not protected by absolute im-
munity for her action in executing the affidavit.3 While absolute
immunity protects a prosecutor for activities in initiating and
prosecuting a case or by otherwise performing acts "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,"4 the
Court concluded in Kalina that "[t]estifying about facts is the
function of the witness, not of the lawyer., 5 The Court found
that the prosecutor in Kalina functioned as a complaining wit-
ness.6 Since a complaining witness was accorded only qualified
immunity at common law7 and no policy concerns justified ex-
tending absolute immunity to a prosecutor for such an action,8
the Court declined to accord absolute immunity to the prosecu-
tor in Kalina for attesting to facts.9
1 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
2 Id. at 505.
'Id. at 510.
4 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).
'Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 510.
6 See id.
7 See id. at 508 n.14.




This Note first argues that Kalina descends directly from Im-
bier v. Pachtman, and does not follow Imbler's intervening prog-
eny. This Note further argues that for policy reasons besides
those articulated by the Court in Kalina, denying the protection
of absolute immunity to the prosecutor in Kalina is justified. To
hold otherwise would cause substantial harm to the judicial pro-
cess and the administration ofjustice.
Finally, this Note discusses whether lower courts have ap-
plied Kalina correctly in light of Imbler. Lower courts have been
able to apply Kalina with ease, but the application of Kalina in
some contexts triggers policy considerations absent in Kalina
but nevertheless worthy of weight due to Imbler. In some cases,
the denial of absolute immunity to a prosecutor has accorded
with the policies recognized by the Court; in others, courts have
extended Kalina too far.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SECTION 1983 AND BIVENS CLAIMS AGAINST PROSECUTORS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides a remedy to
persons who are deprived of their constitutional rights by a state
actor. 0 One who wishes to sue that state actor in his or her in-
dividual capacity typically files a § 1983 claim."
Section 1983 was originally codified as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.2 Following the Civil War, fundamental
'0 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
I See Megan M. Rose, The Endurance of Prosecutorial Immunity-How the Federal Courts
Vitiated Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1996).
"2 See James P. Kenner, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal of the Shield Destroys the
Effectiveness of the Sword, 33 WAsHBURN L.J. 402, 409 (1994). Passed as Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was dubbed the Ku Klux
Klan Act. 1d. at 408 n.59.
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changes occurred in the area of individual civil rights.1 3 Because
of the breakdown in the protection of civil rights in the South
after the Civil War,14 the Reconstruction Congress enacted legis-
lation to protect individuals from oppression by state officials. 5
For example, although the Thirteenth Amendment ended slav-
ery,16 many southern state legislatures enacted laws, known as
the Black Codes, which preserved the subordination of African-
Americans' rights.7 Congress countered the Black Codes by
ratifying and submitting to the states the Fourteenth 8 and Fif-
teenth Amendments, 19 and to enforce them, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.20
The right to redress a violation of a constitutional right by a
federal actor is not derived from statute, but rather was estab-
lished by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.2' A Bivens claim is legally analogous to a § 1983 claim
and is available against a federal prosecutor. The law applicable
to a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that applicable
to a § 1983 claim for individual immunity purposes, and § 1983
and Bivens immunity cases are interchangeable.
's See Kenner, supra note 12, at 408 (citing Jamie K. Lansford, Municipal Liability
Under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871-An Historical Perspective, in SECHON 1983 SWORD
AND SHmLD 23, 24 (Robert H. Freilich & Richard G. Carlisle eds., 1983)).
4 See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA_ L. REv. 841, 851
(1996).
"5 See Kenner, supra note 12, at 408 (citing Lansford, supra note 13, at 24).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ...
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to theirjurisdiction.").
" See Kenner, supra note 12, at 408 n.55 (citing Lansford, supra note 13, at 24).
,8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from "deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
'9 U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting states from denying or abridging a citi-
zen's right to vote based on "race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
SeeKenner, supra note 12, at 409.
SI 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
22See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). While individual immunities to
§ 1983 and Bivens suits are the same, differences exist between the suits. Stephen R.
McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of Law Enforcement Officers
and Agencies, 67J. KAN. B. ASS'N 14, 31 (Sept. 1998). For example, in a Bivens suit, the
plaintiff may not seek liability against the defendant-official's employer. See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). Furthermore, successful plaintiffs in Bivens actions can-
not recover attorney's fees as their counterparts in § 1983 suits may under § 1988. See,
e.g., Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 474
U.S. 193 (1985).
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A § 1983 or Bivens suit permits a plaintiff to sue directly the
state or federal official who allegedly violated her rights.23 For
purposes of § 1983, a state actor includes persons who derive
their authority from a state law or custom.2 ' A prosecutor is a
state actor.25 Thus, when acting "under color of state authority,"
a prosecutor is subject to suit for violating rights secured to a
plaintiff either by the United States Constitution or by a federal
statute. 6 The elements of a § 1983 claim include "(1) a viola-
tion of a constitutional or federal statutory right; (2) proxi-
mately caused; (3) by a 'person;' (4) who acted 'under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia...., 27  The plaintiff
may seek compensatory and punitive damages against the offi-
cial in her individual capacity.2 For the plaintiff to recover
damages in any § 1983 action that would in effect cause the
plaintiffs prior conviction or sentence to become invalid, the
plaintiff must prove that the prior conviction or sentence has
been officially reversed on direct appeal, eliminated by execu-
tive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been the sub-
ject of a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.'
Thus, until a court or executive order officially invalidates a dis-
puted conviction or sentence, it cannot form the basis for a §
1983 claim. 0
"SeeRose, supra note 11, at 1022. See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
24 See supra note 10 for the text of§ 1983.
2See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 50-53 (1992).
2Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
2Rose, supra note 11, at 1023 n.34 (quoting Martin A. Schwartz &John E. Kirklin,
SECrON 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.4 (2d ed. 1991)). Depend-
ing on the claim, the plaintiff may have to prove elements in addition to those of a §
1983 claim. Id. For example, in a suit against a prosecutor for misconduct relating to
a wrongful conviction, a plaintiff must establish that the prior criminal proceeding
ended in favor of the former defendant. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994); Rose, supra note 12, at 1022-23.
"SeeRose, supra note 11, at 1022.




B. IMMUNITY TO SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
On its face, § 1983 makes no exception to liability for any
state official.31 Furthermore, the legislative history reveals Con-
gress did not consider creating any exceptions to the liability.
32
However, in Tenney v. Brandhove,ss the Supreme Court inter-
preted the absence of an exemption to mean that Congress ac-
cepted the immunities generally recognized at the time of §
1983's passage in 1871. 34 Tenney involved the immunity available
to state legislators charged with violating what is presently §
1983."' The Court acknowledged that the Constitution explicitly
conferred immunity on federal legislators, 6 and that both the
English and American common law granted legislative immu-
nity to legislators to prevent nuisance suits from infringing upon
legislative decision-making.3 7 The Court concluded that if Con-
gress had wished to abolish immunities "well grounded in his-
"See supra note 10 for the text of the statute.
s See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 417-29 (1976); Ron S. Chun, Avoiding a Jurassic Dinosaur Run Amok: Circumventing
Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity to Remedy Violation of the Automatic Stay, 98 COM.
LJ. 179, 203 (1993); Wells, supra note 14, at 851 (" [i] mmunity has no more founda-
tion in the text [of § 1983] than in the legislative history ...."); Christina B. Sailer,
Note, Qualified Immunity for Child Abuse Investigators: Balancing the Concerns of Protecting
our Children from Abuse and the Integrity of the Family, 29J. FAM. L. 659, 664 (1991);Jen-
nifer S. Zybtowski, Note, The Case Against Section 1983 Immunity For Witnesses Who Con-
spire With a State Official to Present Perjured Testimony, 93 MxcH. L. REv. 2192, 2211
(1995).
"3 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Tenney addressed the issue of immunity to § 1983 liability
for the first time. Id.
Id. at 376.
See id. at 369. In Tenney, the Supreme Court considered the immunity under 8
U.S.C. § 43, the predecessor to the current 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Section 43 provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
8 U.S.C. § 43 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
6See U.S. CONST. art I, § 6; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372.
.7 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
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tory and reason," such as the legislative immunity, it would have
expressly stated such an intent when it enacted § 1983.38
Tenney's "history and reason" standard established "a two-
prong test to determine whether Congress intended to extend
immunity to a particular defendant under § 1983." 9 Hereafter,
courts used this two-prong test to analyze § 1983 immunity de-
fenses. ° The "historical" criterion focused on "whether Con-
gress was aware of the immunity claimed when it enacted
§ 1983, [yet] chose not to expressly abrogate [it] .,'4 The "rea-
son" component focused on the public policy supporting the
extension of the immunity in the particular case.42
In both § 1983 and Bivens claims, immunity is an affirmative
defense available to the defendant. 3 A defendant may claim ei-
ther absolute or qualified immunity.44 Absolute immunity pro-
vides an affirmative defense to state officials whose special
functions or status require complete protection from civil suit.4 5
Absolute immunity can immediately defeat a civil suit as long as
the official's alleged acts are within the scope of the applicable
immunity, even where the offending official knew that her con-
duct was unlawful, malicious, or otherwise without justification. 6
The Supreme Court only accords absolute immunity where spe-
ciallyjustified by public policy considerations.47
Id. at 376.
39Kenner, supra note 12, at 410; see Tenney, 341 U.S. at 367.
40 See Kenner, supra note 12, at 410; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
41 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376; Kenner, supra note 12, at 410. See also Bums v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Where we
have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have re-
fused to grant such immunity under § 1983.").
42 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. See also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424 (noting that after meeting
the "history" criterion, the Court must then "determine whether the same considera-
tions of public policy that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance abso-
lute immunity under § 1983.").
' See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).
4 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
45 See id.
46 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
41 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 487; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
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Conversely, establishing qualified immunity does not auto-
matically defeat the suit against the public official; rather, it sets
the standard against which the defendant-official's conduct will
be examined.48  Qualified immunity protects the state actor
from liability as long as she does not violate "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."' 9 In the context of § 1983 or Bivens claims,
qualified immunity is presumed to provide adequate protection
for official acts.50 It reflects a "reasonable balance between the
need to protect individual rights and the public interest in pro-
moting the vigorous exercise of official authority."51
The qualified immunity standard presents a threshold ques-
tion to the trial court: whether the currently applicable law was
clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional dep-
rivation.52 If the law was clearly established at the time of the
violation, the qualified immunity defense will ordinarily fail,
since a public official is expected to know the law governing his
office." By contrast, an absolute immunity defense does not re-
quire this initial determination. Thus, "the procedural advan-
tage of absolute immunity, the avoidance of civil suit
significantly earlier in the legal process, makes it a much more
1)54
attractive and coveted defense than qualified immunity....
' See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. SeeImbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13.
'9 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Before Harlow, courts applied a subjective standard, de-
scribed as good faith and probable cause. See id.; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Harlow overruled the prior caselaw to require the courts to apply an objective stan-
dard. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
" See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87. See also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
" Rose, supra note 11, at 1024 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (quoting Butz, 438
U.S. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
52 See id.; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
"See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. The Court acknowledged that the qualified im-
munity defense could succeed where extraordinary circumstances prevented an offi-
cial from obtaining actual knowledge, or reason to know, of the relevant legal
standard. Id. at 819.
" Rose, supra note 11, at 1025.
1999]
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed
the issue of prosecutorial immunity to § 1983 suits four times. 5
1. Imbler v. Pachtman
Relying primarily on public policy, the Court in Imbler v.
Pachtman'6 held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from
civil suit for activities in initiating and prosecuting a case or by
otherwise performing acts "intimately associated with the judi-
cial phase of the criminal process. ''57
After admitting to his involvement in a robbery, Paul Imbler
was charged with the murder of a victim who was killed during
prior robbery.58 Despite Imbler's alibi for the first robbery, po-
lice believed that Imbler had committed it as well. 9 Imbler was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.6 Re-
leased after nine years of incarceration due to the discovery of
new evidence, Imbler sued Pachtman, the prosecuting attorney,
and various other police officers under § 1983, alleging a con-
spiracy to violate his civil rights.6 1
The district court found that Pachtman was immune from
civil suit for the alleged acts.6 ' The court granted his motion to
dismiss because his actions fell into the category of "acts done as
5 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 505 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 261 (1993); Burns, 500 U.S. at 481; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410
(1976).
16 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
-7 id. at 430-31.
"' See id. at 411.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 412.
61 See id. at 415-16. Specifically, Imbler claimed that Pachtman "with intent, and on
other occasions with negligence" allowed a supposed eyewitness to testify falsely, and
that Pachtman was chargeable for the fingerprint expert's suppression of evidence.
Id. at 416. Evidence had emerged that suggested that Pachtman may have known
about some of the inaccuracies that led to Imbler's wrongful incarceration before
Imbler's initial trial. Id. Imbler claimed that Pachtman had known of a lie detector
test that "cleared" Imbler, and that Pachtman had used at trial a police artist's sketch
of the market owner's killer from the first robbery-murder that had been allegedly al-
tered to resemble Imbler. See id.
" Id at 416.
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part of [a prosecutor's] traditional official functions., 63  The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the alleged acts were prose-
cutorial activities integral to the judicial process, and therefore,
that Pachtman was protected from Imbler's suit by absolute
immunity.6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address for the
first time whether a state prosecutor, acting within the scope of
his duties in initiating and prosecuting a case, could be sued
under § 1983.r5 The Imbler Court focused the inquiry on the
"immunity historically accorded [to the prosecutor] at common
law and the interests behind it."6 The Court also stated several
policy justifications for absolute rather than qualified prosecu-
torial immunity. First, frivolous suits by defendants would divert
prosecutors' attention from enforcing criminal law. Second,
such suits would prove an evidentiary challenge to prosecutors
since they would have to prove they acted in good faith usually
years after a criminal trial.6 Third, the threat of liability would
discourage prosecutors from bringing suit in cases where they
thought acquittal was a significant possibility; whereas the
proper course of action would be to let a jury decide the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence.69 Finally, reviewing judges might re-
frain from reversing convictions for fear of triggering a suit
against the prosecutor.70 Although the Court did not indicate
what level of immunity applied to prosecutors engaged in non-
advocatory work, the Court acknowledged that some pretrial
work was an implicit part of advocacy.7' Nevertheless, the Court
admitted that "[d] rawing a proper line between these functions
may present difficult questions" in the future. 2
63 See id.
61 See id.
6' See id. at 410.
"Id. at 420-21. The Court noted that Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind.
1896), which became the majority rule in the states on the issue in the early 20th cen-
tury, was the first case recognizing absolute immunity for prosecutors. Id. at 422.67 See id. at 425.
"See id.
69 Id at 426 n.24.
70 See id. at 427.
7, See id. at 430-31.
72 at 431 n.33.
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2. Burns v. Reed
Fifteen years later, in Burns v. Reed,73 the Supreme Court re-
visited the issue of prosecutorial immunity to address the ques-
tion left open in Imbler what level of immunity should be
accorded to prosecutors for their non-advocatory actions?74
Cathy Burns' two sons were shot while sleeping at home.7 5
During the probable cause hearing, at which police sought a
search warrant, an officer testified that Burns had confessed to
shooting her children. 6 Neither the officer nor Reed, the Chief
Deputy Prosecutor, told the judge that the confession was ob-
tained under hypnosis or that when conscious Bums had consis-
tently denied shooting her sons. The judge issued the search
78
warrant based on the misleading presentation.
The State charged Bums with attempted murder.7 9 How-
ever, because the judge suppressed the statements she made
under hypnosis, the prosecutor dropped all the charges against
her.s Bums then sued Reed and others under § 1983. The dis-
trict court granted Reed a directed verdict based on his asser-
tion of absolute immunity.8' The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
declaring that "a prosecutor should be afforded absolute im-
munity for giving legal advice to police officers about the legal-
ity of their prospective investigative conduct."82
Although the Supreme Court did affirm the district court's
grant of absolute immunity for Reed's testimony at the probable
73 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
71 See id. at 481.
75 See id.
76 See id. The police had consulted Reed, the prosecutor, as to whether hypnosis
was an acceptable investigative technique, and Reed told the officers to proceed. Id.
at 482. Once the officers obtained the "admission" under hypnosis, they once again
consulted Reed, and Reed advised the officers that they "probably had probable
cause" to arrest Burns. Id.
'n See id at 482-83.
7" See id. at 483.
79 See id. at 483. Since both boys lived, Cathy Burns was charged with attempted
murder, not murder in the first degree. Burns v. Reed, 894 F.2d 949, 950-51 (7th Cir.
1990).
8' See Burns, 500 U.S. at 483.
81 See id&
82 894 F.2d at 956.
876 [Vol. 89
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
cause hearing,83 it conferred only qualified immunity for Reed's
advice to arrest Bums. 4 The Court analogized Reed's testimony
at the hearing to that of a witness at trial, who enjoyed common
law immunity even before the passage of § 1983." However, the
common law did not absolutely immunize a prosecutor's advis-
ing police to arrest a suspect.86 The Court rested its conclusion
on the lack of historical support for the action, despite the pol-
icy reasons supporting protection of the action articulated by
the Seventh Circuit and the United States as amicus curiae.
The Court also reasoned that the major policy justification for
absolute prosecutorial immunity-the risk of disruptive, harass-
ing litigation-is absent where it is unlikely that a suspect would
know of the prosecutor's advice to the police.ss Furthermore,
the Court noted that it would be unfair to accord prosecutors
absolute immunity for supplying advice to police while granting
only qualified immunity to police officers for accepting and act-
ing on that advice.8
Writing for the concurring justices, Justice Scalia agreed
that Reed deserved absolute immunity for "eliciting false state-
ments in a judicial hearing,"9 and qualified immunity for pro-
viding legal advice to police officers.91 He wrote separately to
acknowledge Burns' separate cause of action for malicious
prosecution based on her assertion that Reed knowingly se-
cured the search warrant without probable cause.92
Reviewing the common law as it existed in 1870, Scalia
found three categories of immunity.93 First, statements made
during "a court proceeding were absolutely privileged against
See Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-92.
' See id. at 493.
"See id. at 489-90.
"See id. at 493.
87 See id.
"See id. at 494.
89 See id at 495.
SId at 496-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Mar-
shall and Blackmunjoined Scalia in his concurrence.
" See id at 497 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 504 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93 See id. at 499-501 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1999] 877
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... defamation."94 Second, judicial immunity, which was also
absolute, was granted for all acts "relating to the exercise of ju-
dicial functions."9  Finally, a variation of judicial immunity,
"quasi-judicial immunity," was extended to government servants
performing discretionary functions short of adjudication.96
Quasi-judicial immunity was not absolute and could be over-
come by proving malice.97 Justice Scalia concluded that prose-
cutors fell into this third category, and thus deserved only
qualified immunity for the act of providing legal advice to the
police.98
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,99 the Supreme Court further clari-
fied the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity by holding
that absolute immunity should not be accorded to a prosecutor
for false statements made to the media and for allegedly fabri-
cating evidence during the preliminary investigation of a
crime. 00
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's
statements to the press were non-advocatory and, thus, not enti-
tled to absolute immunity.0 1 The common law did not abso-
lutely immunize out-of-court statements to the press, but it
limited immunityfor defamatory statements to those made dur-
ing, and relevant to, judicial proceedings. °2 Furthermore, un-
der the functional approach established in Imbler, comments to
Id. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A Connecticut
Superior Court judge, however, did recently refuse to extend absolute immunity to a
state's attorney when he was accused of revealing confidential HIV-related informa-
tion about an assault victim during a court session. See Barese v. Clark, No. CV-96-
0389890, 1996 WL 663850 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1996).
Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 500 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9See id. at 501 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
0 See id. at 261.




the media neither fall under the prosecutor's advocatory role
nor connect to the judicial process.103
A five-to-four majority also held that the alleged fabrication
of evidence was not advocatory and, thus, not deserving of abso-
lute immunity.1°4 The Court stated that the ultimate question
was whether the function in question was advocator9 or non-
advocatory.' °5 A prosecutor cannot engage in advocatory acts,
however, until probable cause is determined.'O° The Court rec-
ognized that
[t] here is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence
and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and
the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that
might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested,
on the other hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative func-
tions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is "neither
appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should pro-
tect the one and not the other."
07
A determination of probable cause, however, does not
automatically entitle a prosecutor to absolute immunity from li-
ability for all actions taken thereafter.' °8 Police'investigative
work undertaken even after a finding of probable cause will only
deserve qualified immunity." Conversely, a prosecutor will
have absolute immunity when acting in an advocatory capacity
in preparation for the prosecution or for trial itself, including
the professional evaluation of evidence collected by police offi-
cers and the preparation of that evidence for presentation at
trial. 10
The dissent argued that the prosecutor's search for the fa-
vorable expert's testimony constituted trial preparation worthy
10 See id& at 277-78.
' See id. at 272, 282.
'0' See id. at 272-73.
'
0 See id. at 274.
107 M at 273 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
1 See id. at 273 n.5.
109 See id
"o See id. at 273.
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of absolute immunity."' The dissent attacked the probable
cause line drawn by the majority on three fronts. First, probable
cause would have to be an element of any future suit against a
prosecutor, thereby limiting the protection accorded by Imbler."
Second, the majority's holding would encourage prosecutors to
present perjured or fabricated evidence to third parties in order
to secure probable cause and absolute immunity earlier.1
Third, it creates an incentive for prosecutors to avoid pretrial
investigations, for they will not receive absolute protection.
The dissent asserted that the majority misconceived that a
prosecutor functions solely as a police officer before the deter-
mination of probable cause. 5 Justice Scalia concurred with the
majority to reemphasize that the common law in 1871 con-
trolled the level of immunity to be accorded a prosecutor."
6
4. Malley v. Briggs
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court relied on
Malley v. Briggs" 7 in their analysis of Kalina v. Eletcher."8 In Mal-
ley, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to a police of-
ficer who caused an unconstitutional arrest by submitting to a
judge a complaint and supporting affidavit that failed to estab-
lish probable cause.19
The policeman in Malley sought absolute immunity by argu-
ing that he functioned as a complaining witness and alterna-
tively, that he functioned similarly to a prosecutor.2 0 The
Supreme Court rejected both of the officer's arguments.12'
Complaining witnesses were not absolutely immune from suit at
.. See id. at 283-84 (KennedyJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'"See id. at 283 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id (Kennedy,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" See id. at 289 (Kennedy,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116 See id at 279-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
17 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
"
8 Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 508-09 (1997); Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653,
655-56 (9th Cir. 1996).





common law.122 Furthermore, the Court asserted that a police-
man's role is not sufficiently analogous to a prosecutor's since
exposing a prosecutor to liability when seeking an indictment
would interfere with the exercise of the prosecutor's profes-
sional judgment.12 Therefore, the Court denied absolute im-
munity to the police officer on both grounds.12 4
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
As was normally done in her office, Lynne Kalina, a deputy
prosecuting attorney for King County, Washington, filed three
documents in the Superior Court of King County on December
14, 1992, to commence criminal proceedings against Rodney
Fletcher.'2 Two of the documents were unsworn pleadings.
26
The third document was a "Certification for Determination of
Probable Cause" in which Kalina attested to the truth of the
facts set forth therein under penalty of perjury. 27 The judge
found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant based on Ka-
lina's assertions. 28
A few weeks after the police arrested Fletcher, Fletcher's at-
torney discovered errors in the certification and informed Ka-
lina's office.'9 First, Kalina incorrectly stated that Fletcher had
no association with or permission to be at the school where his
fingerprints had been found. In fact, Fletcher had installed
partitions there.3' Second, Kalina stated that an electronics
store employee had identified Fletcher as the person who had
'22 See id. at 340-41.
'23 See id. at 341-43.
121 See id. at 340-43.
' See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct 502, 505 (1997).
'2 See Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1996). Kalina charged Fletcher
in an information with second-degree burglary for stealing computer equipment
from a school and filed an application for an arrest warrant.
127 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 505; WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.085 (1988).
1" See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 505.
'29 See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997) (No. 96-
792).




asked about selling a stolen school computer. 32 Although two
store employees had been shown photo spreads, neither em-
ployee had identified Fletcher.
3 3
Following his arrest, Fletcher spent one day in jail.1 T4 In
light of the inaccuracies that Kalina brought to the court's at-
tention about a month later, the trial court dismissed the
charges against Fletcher.35 Fletcher sued Kalina under § 1983
for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
be free from unreasonable seizures.
3 6
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kalina moved for summary judgment alleging that her in-
volvement in filing the three documents was protected by abso-
lute prosecutorial immunity.3 7 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington denied the motion.
38
The court held that Kalina did not have absolute immunity, and
that whether she was entitled to qualified immunity was a ques-
tion of fact to be determined at trial. 9 Applying Supreme
Court precedent,140 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court
on Kalina's interlocutory appeal.' 41 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that because the police officer in Malley, who secured an arrest
warrant without probable cause, was denied absolute immu-
nity,142 Kalina too must be denied absolute immunity because
she functioned almost identically to the police officer in Mal-
ley.1 To grant Kalina absolute immunity, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned, would violate the Supreme Court's functional approach
132 See id
1" Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Gir. 1996).
See Petitioner's Brief at 6 n.3, Kalina (No. 96-792).
', See id. at 6.




"' See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478
(1991); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976).
14 See 93 F.3d at 654.
142 See Maley, 475 U.S. at 342.
" See93 F.3d at 655-56.
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to immunity questions.14 Thus, the Ninth Circuit refused to
grant absolute immunity to Kalina for her actions in filing the
certification and remanded the case for a determination of
whether Kalina violated a "clearly established right of which a
reasonable person would have known." 14 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecu-
tor from liability for making false statements of fact in an affida-
vit supporting an application for an arrest warrant.146
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens held that a
prosecutor is not protected by absolute immunity when she at-
tests to facts in support of a finding of probable cause when
seeking an arrest warrant.47 In so holding, the Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's ruling.1
4 8
The Court began by examining the source of prosecutorial
immunity, noting the previous caselaw on the issue, and then re-
iterating the appropriate test to be applied by the Court to de-
termine what level of immunity is proper.4 9 Although § 1983
does not expressly codify immunity from the liability it creates,
the Court construed the statute to confer immunities that were
well settled at the time of its enactment in 1871.5
Turning next to the caselaw, the court summarized its juris-
prudence by stating that the cases of late made it "clear that it is
the interest in protecting the proper functioning of the office,
rather than the interest in protecting its occupant, that is of
primary importance" in determining what immunity to accord
"' See id. at 656.
145 Id
"6 SeeKalinav. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502,505 (1997).
"
7 Id. at 510.
148see id!.
"' See id. at 506-08.
"o See id.- at 506 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)). See supra note
10 for the text of the statute.
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to a prosecutor.91 The Court acknowledged that while Imbler v.
Pachtman52 set out the policy considerations that justified the
extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors when function-
ing in their traditional roles, it did not address what level of
immunity would be accorded to a prosecutor functioning in a
non-advocatory role.'53 Burns v. Reed5 and Buckley v. Fitzsim-
mons155 confirmed the importance to the judicial process of pro-
tecting the prosecutor when she is serving as an advocate in
judicial proceedings, but also illustrated that the defense of ab-
solute immunity is unavailable when the prosecutor is perform-
ing a different fimction.5 6 In conformity with prior decisions,
the Court then confirmed that immunity attaches to "'the na-
ture of the function performed, not the identity of the actor
who performed it.""
57
The Court then addressed the case relied upon by the
Ninth Circuit in its decision, Malley v. Briggs.5' 8 The Court exam-
ined Kalina's action in light of Malley, asking specifically
whether Kalina acted as a complaining witness rather than as a
lawyer when she attested to the facts in the certification.59 Al-
though the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable
cause when seeking an arrest warrant,'1 neither federal nor
state law required the prosecutor to make the certification.16' In
fact, "tradition, as well as the ethics of [the legal] profession, in-
struct[ed] counsel to avoid the risks associated with participat-
ing as both advocate and witness in the same proceeding."
62
.. Id. at 507.
,12 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
'"See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 506-07.
500 U.S. 478 (1991).
151 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 507-08.
,7Id. at 508 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)).
' See id& See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
"9 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509.
'60 See id.; see also U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
161 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509. Police officers normally attest to the facts in an af-
fidavit filed in support of an application for an arrest warrant, and only two counties
in Washington require a prosecutor to file a document beyond an information. Id. at
509 n.16.162Id. at 509.
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Addressing Kalina's conduct, the Court stated that everything
short of executing the certification-her determination that the
evidence against Fletcher was compelling enough to constitute
probable cause, her decision to charge Fletcher, her drafting of
the certification, her presentation of the information to the
court, and even her selection of the particular facts to include in
the certification-involved the exercise of professional judg-
ment.10 However, "that judgment could not affect the truth or
falsity of the factual statements themselves. Testifying about
facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer."' 64 The
Court thus found that Kalina performed an act of any compe-
tent witness, denied absolute immunity on that basis, and held
that § 1983 may provide a remedy when a prosecutor functions
as a complaining witness.10
Lastly, the Court rejected Kalina's claim that denying abso-
lute immunity in this instance would have a "chilling effect" on
prosecutors.r' Kalina offered no evidence supporting her asser-
tion.167
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Scalia joined in the opinion of the Court,
he wrote separately to point out that the Court's functional ap-
proach to § 1983 immunity questions "has produced some curi-
ous inversions of the common law as it existed in 1 8 7 1 .'168
Justice Scalia asserted that the thrust of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions with regard to prosecutorial immunity
was exactly opposite to the common law as it existed in 1871,
when § 1983 was enacted.1 9 The Court's recent cases instructed
that prosecutors "have absolute immunity for the decision to
seek an arrest warrant after filing an information, but only
qualified immunity for testimony as a witness in support of the




"' Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence.
"9 See id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
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warrant."170 However, according to Justice Scalia, no absolute
prosecutorial immunity existed in 1871.'
Justice Scalia outlined three types of immunities that were
in existence in 1871.172 First, the common law recognized an ab-
solute judicial immunity which extended to all persons-judges,
jurors, members of courts martial, private arbitrators, and vari-
ous assessors and commissioners-who resolved disputes be-
tween other parties or "authoritatively adjudicat[ed] private
rights."'17 Second, the common law protected witnesses and at-
torneys from prosecution for statements made during a judicial
proceeding.1 74 Third, a "quasi-judicial" immunity extended to
officials who "made discretionary policy decisions that did not
involve actual adjudications."' 75 Justice Scalia likened this
"quasijudicial" immunity to the modem "qualified" immunity
because it was not absolute; it could be defeated by a showing of
malice and absence of probable cause. 7  Reiterating the posi-
tion he took in Burns v. Reed,177 Justice Scalia asserted that had
prosecutors existed in their modem form in 1871, their func-
tions would have been considered quasi-judicial, and thus, they
would have been entitled only to qualified immunity.' 78
If Fletcher brought his case against Kalina in 1871, Justice
Scalia asserted, the tort would be Kalina's decision to prosecute
Fletcher and Kalina would be liable only if Fletcher could prove
that the prosecution was malicious, lacking in probable cause,
and unsuccessful.'7 Kalina's false statements as a witness in
support of the warrant would not have been an independent ac-
tionable tort since such testimony was absolutely protected from
170 Id. (ScaliaJ, concurring).
17, See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, even the majority notes that there was no
such thing as the modern public prosecutor in 1871. See id. at 506 n.1l.
"' Id. at 510-11 (Scalia,J., concurring).
'" Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
'7' Id- at 511 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
7- Id. at 510 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
176 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
'77 500 U.S. 478 (1991). See also supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion ofJustice Scalia's concurrence in Burns v. Reed.
178 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 510 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
179 See id. at 511 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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defamation suits, although it may have been evidence of mal-
ice. aS°
The current prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence would
create immunities opposite those recognized in 1871.181 Justice
Scalia argued that the functional analysis used by the Court
"can [not] faithfully replicate the common law.' 82 He reasoned
that since "complaining witnesses" are subject to suit for their
involvement in initiating or procuring the prosecution, then tes-
tifying is the crucial event.183 The distinction between "witness"
and "complaining witness," namely the involvement in the ini-
tiation of the prosecution, was relatively harmless in Malley.'84 In
Kalina, however, Imbler and Malley "collide to produce a rule
that stands the common law on its head: Kalina is absolutely
immune from any suit challenging her decision to prosecute or
seek an arrest warrant, but can be sued if she changes 'func-
tional categories' by providing personal testimony to the
Court.""'5
Despite this departure from the common law, Justice Scalia
urged adherence to Imbler and the functional approach to im-
munity questions since they are "so deeply embedded in our §
1983 jurisprudence" that stare decisis governs.1'86
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE STATE OF PROSECUTORAL IMMUNITYJURISPRUDENCE
Kalina v. Fletche' 87 takes a fresh stab at defining the scope of
the absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine. Imbler v. Pacht-
man'8 laid out the Court's functional approach to prosecutorial
immunity questions, and Burns v. Reed89 and Buckley v. Fitzsim-
1"* See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
18 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
182 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
See id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
184 See id at 512 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
187 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
18 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See also supra Part II.C.1.
500 U.S. 478 (1991). See also supra Part II.C.2.
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ns190 applied the functional test, holding that absolute immu-
nity extended to a prosecutor only while acting as an advocate,
which the Court limited to the period following a determination
of probable cause. Kalina does not build on Burns and BuckLey.
Rather, Kalina is better seen as a third direct qualification of the
broad rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity set forth in Im-
bier.
Kalina highlights trends in the Court's analysis of absolute
prosecutorial immunity cases. Where a prosecutor performs ad-
vocatory functions not intimately associated with the judicial
process, the Court looks to the common law of 1871 and weighs
the Imbler policy considerations to determine whether to extend
absolute immunity to the prosecutor. 9' Where a prosecutor
performs an investigative or administrative activity, the Court
consults the common law but declines to weigh the Imbler policy
considerations. 9 2  Where a prosecutor performs a non-
advocatory, non-administrative, and non-investigatory activity,
the Court again declines to consider policy when the function
enjoys no common law support for absolute immunity and can
be performed by other individuals.93
Burns identified a singular function, advising,194 that would
not be protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.9 5 Burns
concluded that a prosecutor's provision of legal advice to the
police, although advocatory, was not so "'intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process"' that it deserved
absolute prosecutorial immunity.16 The.Court came to that
conclusion by noting the lack of historical support for immunity
for the activity and the lack of other policy reasons justifying the
extension of absolute immunity to that activity. 9 7 In reaching its
" 509 U.S. 259 (1993). See also supra Part II.C.3.
"' Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
,9 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
'
9 Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 507 (1997).
1" The Burns Court did not term the activity of providing legal advice to police as
"advising," but I will hereafter refer to the activity as such.
,9 Burns, 500 U.S. at 493.
' Id. at 493 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). See also supra
Part II.C.2.
'9 See id. at 493-96.
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conclusion, the Court consulted the policy considerations iden-
tified in Imber.98 Although the Court did not identify advising
as investigative or administrative, Burns directly qualified the
rule set forth in Imbler.
Buckley chipped away further at the administrative and inves-
tigative ambiguity left by Imbler. It too directly qualified Imbler's
rule by identifying separate functions for which a prosecutor
would not be accorded absolute immunity. In Buckley, the
prosecutor's search for a sympathetic bootprint expert was in-
vestigative, and his convening of the grand jury to consider the
evidence the work produced was administrative. Further-
more, the Court denied absolute immunity to the prosecutor
for holding a press conference, not because the activity was ad-
ministrative or investigative, however, but because "a prosecutor
is in no different position than other executive officials who
deal with the press.,,200 The Court declined to examine public
policy considerations when concluding that statements to the
press deserved only qualified immunity, reasoning that when
"the prosecutorial function is not within the advocate's role and
there is no historical tradition of immunity on which [the
Court] can draw, [the Court's] inquiry is at an end.,20 ' Likewise,
the Court did not weigh the Imbler policy considerations when it
could neatly characterize the prosecutor's activity as administra-
202tive or investigative.
In Kalina, the Court examined what the prosecutor asserted
was advocatory conduct-attesting to facts to support a finding
of probable cause-and distinguished the preparation of the af-
fidavit from its actual execution.2 3  This distinction, while it
identified another function for which absolute immunity will be
denied to a prosecutor, does not help to clarify the continuing
ambiguity surrounding the line between a prosecutor's advoca-
1' See id.
9 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993). See also supra Part
II.C.3.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278.
201 Id.
" See id. at 275-76.




tory and investigative or administrative functions. The Kalina
Court does not categorize Kalina's activity of attesting °5 as inves-
tigative or administrative. For this reason, Kalina does not fol-
low Buckley. Nor does Kalina follow Burns since attesting does
not build on the advising function analyzed in Burns. In Kalina,
the Court cited to Burns and Buckley only to support the proposi-
tions that when a prosecutor serves as an advocate, he is pro-
tected by absolute immunity; when a prosecutor performs a
different function, he is not.20 6 Finally, Kalina does not claim to
be progeny of either Burns or Buckley. Thus, Kalina should be
analyzed as a third direct qualification of Imbler.
Although the Court did not explicitly identify attesting as
being beyond the scope of a prosecutor's advocatory duties, it
has done so implicitly. First, the Court denied absolute immu-
nity to the prosecutor for attesting to facts as a complaining wit-
ness.20  Applying the Imbler standard, the Court found that
Kalina was not acting as a advocate in initiating or presenting
the state's case when she attested to facts supporting probable
cause, and thus was not entitled to absolute immunity.
2 8
Furthermore, the Court did not recognize attesting as an
administrative or investigative responsibility of the prosecutor's
office; it did not constitute normal non-quasi-judicial activity
2°9
for which qualified immunity would be appropriate. Kalina's
activity, attesting, was one that "any competent witness might
have performed., 210 Furthermore, the common law did not pro-
vide historical support for extending absolute immunity for its
performance. Thus, Kalina was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity.
204 SeeKenner, supra note 12, at 425.
20" The Kalina Court did not term the activity of attesting to facts in support of
probable cause as "attesting," but I will hereafter refer to the activity as such.
'04 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 507.
207 See id. at 510.
2'See id. at 509.
' Normal non-quasi-judicial activity is conduct performed by a prosecutor that is
unrelated to the judicial process. See Anthony J. Luppino, Supplementing the Functional
Test of Prosecutorial Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REv. 487, 505 (1982).
2'0 Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509.
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Last, and most strikingly, the Court went so far as to admon-
ish prosecutors against attesting.21' This more than anything
else reveals the Court's sentiment that attesting is beyond the
scope of a prosecutor's duties. The Court did, however, extend
qualified immunity to Kalina in accordance with law set forth in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald12 and the immunity granted to complaining
witnesses at common law.
215
This analysis helps to discern the method by which the
Court resolves prosecutorial immunity cases. The Court's analy-
sis in Kalina is similar to that in Burns in that both cases identify
a new function, neither administrative nor investigative, for
which absolute immunity is unavailable. However, in Burns, be-
cause the activity was within the role of the prosecutor as advo-
cate, the Court then consulted the policy considerations
enumerated in ImbLer to determine whether extending the abso-
lute immunity doctrine was justified.2 4 It did not do so in Ka-
lina, for it regarded attesting to be outside the scope of a
prosecutor's duties. In Buckley, the Court also by-passed the pol-
icy analysis where it could characterize the prosecutor's activity
as administrative or investigative,215 and where the activity was
outside the role of the prosecutor and had no common law
foundation. 6 The analysis in Kalina, then, is most analogous to
that conducted by the Court in Buckley of the prosecutor's
statements at a press conference. Both attesting and giving a
press conference were outside the scope of a prosecutor's duties
as advocate, and neither were accorded absolute immunity at
common law. Thus, in Kalina and in Buckley with regard to the
giving of a press conference, the Court did not consider the Im-
b/er policy factors.
2. See id. at 509 and n.17, 510.
21 457 U.S. 800, 816-18 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.").
212 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 508 n.14.
214 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493-96 (1991). See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 424-29 (1976).
21- See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993).
2'6 See id. at 278.
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The Kalina Court did, however, note a new policy consid-
eration uniquely triggered by the scenario of the case. The
Court questioned the appropriateness of prosecutorial attesting
in light of the rules of professional ethics.217
B. KAL!NA WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
Kalina's value springs from the clarity of the opinion and
message.2 18 The case instructs that when a prosecutor acts as a
complaining witness, she will be granted only qualified immu-
nity.219 A unanimous Court proclaimed that a prosecutor's at-
testation to false facts will not be protected under the guise of
professional judgment.220 The Court gave deference to the ex-
ercises of professional judgment that are involved in preparing
and obtaining an arrest warrant, but it appropriately protected
only the means by which a court reaches the truth and renders
justice. 22' The Court was clear in articulating that it will not in-
fringe upon the prosecutor's decision whether or not to seek an
arrest warrant; it just refused to protect the prosecutor from li-
222
ability for attesting.
Even if Kalina's actions were difficult to categorize, an ex-
amination of the policy considerations concerning the exten-
sion of immunity to prosecutors would readily reveal that a
grant of absolute immunity would have been inappropriate in
Kalina. Imbler provides the starting point for identifying the fac-
tors to consider.23 Generally, Imbler factors balance the harm to
the prosecutor's ability to exercise discretion against the harm
to defendants in denying redress. 4 Subsequent cases relying on
Imb/eis policy considerations highlighted specific factors loyal to
217 See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509 & n.17 (citing WASH. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.7 ("'A law-
yer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer... is likely to be a necessary
witness,' unless four narrow exceptions apply"), and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDuC Rule 3.7 (1992) (same)).
218 See infra Part V.C.1.
2 9 Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 510.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See id. at 509-10.
22 SeeLuppino, supra note 212, at 511.




the principles in Imbler. (1) the potential number of ensuing
civil suits; (2) the associated costs of time and effort in defend-
ing the suits; (3) the reluctance of prosecutors to point out
later-discovered exculpatory evidence; (4) the danger that
judges will be less prone to reverse convictions if doing so might
lead to a prosecutor's liability; and (5) the ability of the justice
system to "check" or correct the effects of misconduct in per-
forming the function in question. 22 Kalina identified another
policy consideration: whether the prosecutor's activity would
violate the rules of professional ethics.226
Although the Court did not specifically address them, many
of the aforementioned policy considerations supporting the ex-
tension of absolute immunity to a prosecutor are absent in Ka-
lina. First, denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor who
attests to facts in order to support a finding of probable cause
would not significantly harm the prosecutor's ability to exercise
discretion on behalf of the state. The Court specifically ac-
knowledged and vowed to protect the prosecutor's exercises of
professional judgment involved in preparing and obtaining an
arrest warrant.227 Furthermore, the prosecutor presented no
evidence that the administration of justice would be harmed if
the King County practice of having the prosecutor attest to facts
in support of probable cause were no longer followed.228 A
prosecutor need not fill the role of complaining witness when
she does not have first hand knowledge of the facts. As such a
role is not within a prosecutor's necessary functions, denying
absolute immunity to a prosecutor acting as a complaining wit-
ness does not impair her ability to exercise discretion in her ad-
vocatory role.
Second, in light of the fact that there is no sound policy
supporting extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors at-
n' See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-28. See, e.g., Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499,
509 (5th Cir. 1980); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 633 (7th Cir. 1979); Dono-
van v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1970); Redcross v. County of Rens-
selaer, 511 F. Supp. 364, 371 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072,
1083-84 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1304 (D.D.C. 1976).
See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509.
2' See id. at 509-10.
m See id. at 510.
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testing to facts supporting probable cause when they do not
have first hand knowledge, denying redress to defendants would
be particularly severe. Were any person other than the prosecu-
tor acting as the complaining witness, the defendant would be
able to seek relief. In Kalina, the Supreme Court specifically
stated that such status-based grants of immunity are inappropri-
ate.
22
Third, the potential for suits against a prosecutor for attest-
ing to facts might be equal to or even greater than the number
of suits brought against the original witness. Room for error ex-
ists in the communication of the facts from the original witness
to the prosecutor. Real world experience instructs that greater
accuracy resides in the person closest along the chain of com-
munication to the events in dispute. Where a prosecutor attests
to facts communicated to her by another person, she is more
likely to mischaracterize or misrepresent them than she would
be if she witnessed the events herself, thus making it more
probable that a defendant's constitutional rights would be im-
pacted and that a defendant would bring suit. The facts of Ka-
lina nicely support this point.
20
Finally, the justice system provides a method to correct the
prosecutor's conduct in Kalina. It may require the person with
first hand knowledge, normally the police officer, to attest to
the facts. Although more troublesome in some situations to the
prosecutor to require the police officer, or whomever supplied
the prosecutor with the facts, to attest to those facts supporting
probable cause, policy justifications weigh in favor of doing so.
The integrity of the criminal justice system would be strength-
ened by such a rule. Our justice system places a premium on
truthful witness testimony. To encourage Kalina's conduct by
guarding it with absolute immunity contradicts the system's
principles. Striving to help to guarantee the truthfulness of wit-
' See id at 507-08.
2" The Certification for Determination of Probable Cause to which Kalina attested
summarized the evidence against Fletcher generated by the police investigation. See
Brief for Petitioner at 5, Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997) (No. 96-792). Kalina
did not collect the evidence herself, she merely relied upon the police report to draft
the Certification. See id. at 7. Kalina could have miscommunicated the police find-
ings in the Certification.
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ness statements should forever be the Court's objective. As Jus-
tice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, absolute prosecu-
torial immunity is "also based on the policy of protecting the
judicial process.... It is precisely the function of a judicial pro-
ceeding to determine where the truth lies."231
For reasons besides those articulated by courts, it is sound
policy to hold prosecutors to the qualified immunity standard
for attesting to facts to support the issuance of an arrest warrant,
because to hold otherwise would cause substantial harm to the
judicial process and the administration of justice. Arrest war-
rants arising from false facts given by a prosecutor would leave
innocent citizens without any legal remedy. Furthermore, a po-
tential for abuse exists with such a rule; without the possibility of
liability, a prosecutor could obtain arrest warrants with aban-
don. Fourth Amendment warrant procedures are a protection
that can only be enforced by the courts,3 2 a fact that reinforces
the Court's need to protect the integrity of the system in such a
way.
Lastly, the Court's rule in Kalina creates the incentive for
prosecutors to investigate the facts reported to them by the po-
lice. Although the Court cautioned prosecutors against attest-
ing to facts to support probable cause, it did not prohibit such
activity.2 33 Should prosecutors, like those in King County, Wash-
ington, continue to attest to facts, they open themselves up to
possible liability. Knowing this, they will more thoroughly in-
quire into the facts reported by the police and be more cautious
about executing such supporting documents. While Kalina will
affect how prosecutors do their jobs, it will do so in a positive
way.
C. THE WAKE OF KALINA
Lower courts have applied Kalina with ease.2 - They are,
however, still testing the limit of its holding.3 5 As a guiding
23 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976) (White,J, concurring).
"2 See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
" See Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 509-10.
"' See e.g., Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 187 (1st Cir.
1998) (relying, in part, on Kalina to accord qualified immunity to a police officer who
filed an affidavit containing allegedly false facts in support of a search warrant);
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principle, the Supreme Court's decisions have frequently held
that a state official's absolute immunity should extend only to
acts in performance of particular functions of his office.2 6 But
the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than
"history and reason" would support.237 In Kalina, the Court drew
a line between prosecutorial advocacy and participation. The
boundaries of that line remain unclear, however, and the lower
courts, zealously following the Court's sentiment that qualified
immunity provides adequate protection to most functions, have
at times denied absolute immunity based on Kalina in some-
times unfounded circumstances.m Thus, while Kalina is a
sound opinion with a rule easy for lower courts to apply, over-
extension of its rule has already occurred.
1. Roberts v. Kling
In Roberts v. Kling,23 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed a case with
facts similar to Kalina. The court appropriately relied upon Ka-
lina in reaching its conclusion, and the case exemplifies the easy
application of the Kalina rule.240 In Roberts, a former criminal
Sheehan v. Colangelo, 27 F. Supp.2d 344 (D. Conn. 1998); Orobono v. Koch, 30 F.
Supp.2d 840, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Richards v. City of New York, No. 97 Civ.
7990(MBM), 1998 WL 567842, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1998); Haywood v. Nye, 999 F.
Supp. 1451, 1458 (D. Utah 1998); Brathwaite v. Bunitsky, No. Civ. A. 97-194-SLR,
1998 WL 299357, at *5 and n.9 (D. Del. May 21, 1998).
See, e.g., Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1998) (relying on Kalina in
finding absolute immunity for police officers when they perform prosecutorial func-
tions); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3rd Cir.
1998) (citing to Kalina to support the application of the functional test to legislative
immunity questions); Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F. Supp. 2d 292, 303-04 (D.N.J.
1998) (discussing the applicability of prosecutorial immunity doctrine to parole offi-
cers).
2m See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978); cf. Inmbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
'7 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755-56 (1982). See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 363 & n.12 (1978) (applying judicial privilege even to acts occurring
outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 575 (1959) (asserting that the fact "that the action here taken was within the
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege applica-
ble."); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (extending privilege to all matters
"committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision").
' See, e.g., Lucas v. Parish of'Jefferson, 999 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. La. 1998); Newton
v. Etoch 965 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1998).
2'9 144 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 1998).
2'0 See id. at 711.
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suspect sued Kling, an investigator for the district attorney's of-
fice, alleging that Kling "knowingly and willfully executed a
criminal complaint, based on false and misleading factual alle-
gations. 2 4' The complaint resulted in the issuance of a warrant
for Roberts' arrest.
242
Reviewing the case in light of Kalina, the Tenth Circuit dis-
tinguished the investigator's action of preparing the criminal
complaint and that of executing the complaint under penalty of
perjury.24 Relying on Kalina, the court held that the investiga-
tor was entitled to absolute immunity for his actions in prepar-
ing a criminal complaint against Roberts and in seeking a
warrant for her arrest, but deserved only qualified immunity for
his conduct in executing the criminal complaint.244 Roberts ex-
emplifies the clarity of the Kalina decision. The court applied
Kalina with ease, and did so properly.245
2. Lucas v. Parish ofJefferson
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana cited
Kalina in Lucas v. Parish of Jefferson 46 in support of its holding
that where a prosecutor files a Rule to Revoke Probation, the
prosecutor acts merely as a probation or police officer and, ac-
cordingly, is entitled only to qualified immunity.
247
The court relied on Kalina for its straightforward applica-
tion of the functional test, and for the proposition that when a
prosecutor elects to function in another capacity, the prosecu-
2"' Id. at 710.
2'2 See id. Roberts had been accused of failing to return her children to the custody
of their father in violation of a court order. See id at 711. Roberts asserted that the
complaint misrepresented where she was at the time of the abduction and lacked in-
formation about a parenting plan between her and the children's father which would
support her contention that she was not in violation. See id at 712.
243 See id. at 711.
2" See id. (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1997)).
24 Roberts can be distinguished from Kalina in that the defendant was an investiga-
tor for the district attorney's office, not a prosecutor, and that the document to which
he swore was a criminal complaint, not a certification of the facts supporting the issu-
ance of an arrest warrant. Nevertheless, the state actor in Roberts and the document
to which he swore were functionally analogous to those in Kalina and support a hold-
ing resting on Kalina.
246 999 F. Supp. 839, 844 (E.D. La. 1998).
247 See id. at 847.
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tor is entitled to the level of immunity accorded to that capac-
ity.248 The Lucas court argued that while a prosecutor's initial
decision to prosecute an individual is seemingly analogous to
the decision to revoke probation, it is not so under further scru-
tiny.29 The district court noted that qualified immunity was the
norm and that only in "exceptional situations where it is dem-
onstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of
the public business" will such immunity be afforded.20
In Louisiana, the probation officer, not the prosecutor, is
responsible for supervising probation and reporting violations
to the court.21 The court further noted that Louisiana statutory
law does not even mention the prosecutor when discussing the
procedure for summoning an individual for a violation of pro-
bation; it assumes that the probation officer will commence
such action. 2 A probation officer who moves to revoke proba-
tion is protected only by qualified immunity.2
3
In light of Kalina and other jurisprudence, the Lucas court
held that the prosecutor performed the function of a probation
officer when he filed a Rule to Revoke Probation. z4 Addition-
ally, by filing the Revocation, the prosecutor represented to the
court that probable cause existed to summon the probationer
for possible violations, a function analogous to a police officer's
seeking an arrest warrant.25 Accordingly, the prosecutor was
only entitled to qualified immunity, the same immunity ac-
corded to a probation or police officer.2
6
The Lucas court has helped to define the line between
prosecutorial acts that are advocatory and those that are merely
participatory. Like the Kalina court, the Lucas court grappled
2'8 See id at 844.
211 See i& at 845.
2'0 Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
2" See id. (citing LA. CODE GRIM. P. art. 893 (1997)).
212 See id at 846.
21 See id. (citing Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370, 370 (8th Cir. 1984); Galvan v. Gar-
mon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983)).





with a prosecutorial activity that could not easily be character-
ized as advocatory, administrative, or investigative. z7 However,
arguably an advocatory function, revoking the probation was
conduct that could be viewed as "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process"2' and a function that was
within the prosecutor's duty to determine whether a person
should be charged. In Lucas, the filing of the revocation by the
prosecutor could be seen as a charge: the prosecutor evaluated
the evidence, determined that the probationers had violated the
law, and because of the violators' status as probationers, initi-
ated appropriate proceedings against them by filing the Revoca-
tion. However, because a probation officer normally performed
the same action, the court placed great weight on the incongru-
ity of according a prosecutor absolute immunity for an activity
for which another received only qualified immunity.29 Notably
the Lucas court offered only that one policy reason to support
its judgment.
In Kalina, by contrast, the prosecutor was denied absolute
immunity not only because another individual normally per-
formed the activity and it lacked common law support, but also
because the holding comported with an overwhelming number
of policy reasons. 6° Imbler still provides the guidelines for decid-
ing when absolute immunity is appropriate. 26' The decision to
grant absolute immunity entails a balancing of the strain on the
prosecutor's ability to function against the public's need for re-
course. The only policy reason behind the Lucas decision was
that a probation officer receives only qualified immunity for the
same activity. The decision does comport with the Supreme
Court's sentiment that the "absolute immunity that protects the
prosecutor's role as an advocate is not grounded in any special
'esteem for those who perform these functions, and not from a
'1 See id. at 845-47.
2' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1997).
" See Lucas v. Parish ofJefferson, 999 F. Supp. 839, 847 (E.D. La. 1998).
"0 See supra Part V.B.
,61 See supra Part II.C.1; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976).
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desire to shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree
of immunity could impair the judicial process itself."'2 62
However, denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor for fil-
ing a Revocation of Probation does impair the judicial process.
The activity is sufficiently analogous to a prosecutor's role as an
advocate in initiating and prosecuting a case. This being the
case, all the policy considerations articulated in Imbler should
apply. Accordingly, Lucas has extended the reasoning of Kalina
to an inappropriate extent.
3. Newton v. Etoch
In Newton v. Etoch,263 the Supreme Court of Arkansas relied,
in part, on Kalina in holding that a prosecutor who knowingly
directed the preparation of a materially false affidavit support-
ing the issuance of an arrest warrant was not entitled to absolute
immunity because the alleged conduct fell "outside of tradi-
tional prosecutorial functions ....,2
The prosecutor, Carruth, asserted generally that he was not
subject to suit due to absolute prosecutorial immunity.26 Fol-
lowing a lengthy discussion of the development of prosecutorial
immunity jurisprudence, the Arkansas Supreme Court first lik-
ened the prosecutor's knowing direction and supervision of
false testimony for an arrest warrant affidavit to allegations that
a prosecutor fabricated evidence during the preliminary investi-
gation of a crime, the scenario at issue in Buckley v. Fitzsim-
ns.2' The Buckley Court held such conduct to be investigative,
as opposed to advocatory, and accorded the prosecutor in that
case qualified immunity for that conduct.267 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court further analogized the prosecutor's actions to
those of the prosecution in Kalina.26 "[TIhe [United States Su-
preme] Court recently held that a prosecutor does not receive
262 Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 508 (1997) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 342 (1986)).
26 965 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1998).
26 Id at 103.
215 See id. at 98.
266 See idi at 103. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993).
267 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 279.
2's See Newton, 965 S.W.2d at 103.
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absolute immunity for swearing to false information in an affi-
davit for an arrest warrant in Kalina v. Fletcher... It logically fol-
lows that knowingly directing the preparation of a materially
false affidavit would not pass muster."69
On its face, the holding seems unwarranted under Kalina,
for Kalina merely addressed a prosecutor's actual attestation to
the facts. Here, the prosecutor did not sign his name to the af-
fidavit; he did not personally vouch for the truth of the state-
ments under penalty of perjury. In Kalina, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that a prosecutor's involvement in the drafting
of such an affidavit and in deciding which facts to include in the
document were protected by absolute immunity.270 Therefore,
Kalina seemingly does not apply.
Even if the plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor directed the
drafting of the affidavit knowing it to be false, he should still be
entitled to absolute immunity. The reasons articulated in Imbler
provide the guidelines for deciding when absolute immunity is
appropriate. 27 The decision to grant absolute immunity entails
a balancing of the strain on the prosecutor's ability to function
against the public's need for recourse. Although subversion of
justice should be avoided, the costs of exposing a prosecutor to
liability in this case would be too high. A challenge to the
prosecutor's level of knowledge every time an arrest warrant is-
sued would greatly jeopardize the prosecutor's ability effectively
to represent the state. A suit against him would direct his atten-
tion away from his duties, and potential liability would infringe
upon the "vigorous exercise of his official authority. 2 72 More
importantly, in the scenario presented in Newton, the defendant
would not be denied recourse if the prosecutor were granted
absolute immunity for knowingly directing a false affidavit. The
defendant could recover from the signer of the affidavit, the po-
%9 Id
2'0 SeeKalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 509-10 (1997). "[E]xcept for [the prosecu-
tor's] act in personally attesting to the truth of the averments in the certification, it
seems equally clear that the preparation and filing of the [certification] was part of
the advocate's function" and were, therefore, activities protected by absolute immu-
nity. Id. at 509.
2" See supra Part II.C.1; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976).
' Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
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lice officer, provided he could prove that the signer violated
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."273 Although a potential
for abuse exists, the strain on the prosecutor's office would be
great, and the harm to the public's ability to seek recourse
would be minimal. Therefore, a prosecutor's knowing direction
of a false affidavit should be protected by absolute immunity
where a defendant would be able to recover damages from an-
other source. Thus, Newton's holding is not warranted by Ka-
lina.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a unanimous opinion, the Kalina Court correctly con-
cluded that the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity
should not protect a prosecutor when she attests to facts in an
affidavit supporting the issuance of an arrest warrant.274 In so
holding, Kalina identified attesting as another activity for which
a prosecutor will not be accorded absolute immunity, and there-
fore, directly qualified the broad rule of absolute prosecutorial
immunity announced in Imbler v. Pachtman.275
Kalina is valuable to prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence
for several reasons. The case articulated a new policy considera-
tion: whether the prosecutor's activity violates a rule of profes-
sional ethics. The holding is easy to apply, and the decision was
necessary and proper in order to prevent substantial harm to
the judicial process and the administration ofjustice.
The addition of Kalina to prosecutorial immunity jurispru-
dence allows for the identification of trends in the Supreme
276Court's analysis of these cases. In some cases, the Court de-
clines to consider policy arguments for extending absolute im-
munity to a prosecutor for certain activities. However, guiding
principles in the Court's analysis remain whether the common
law recognized absolute immunity for the activity; whether the
" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The defendant in Newton sued
both the police officer and the prosecutor. Newton, 965 S.W.2d at 97-98.
274 Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 510 (1997).
2" 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
216 See supra Part V.A.
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activity is advocatory; and whether the policy arguments articu-
lated in Imbler weigh in favor of granting absolute immunity.
While Imb/eis progeny have qualified its rule, Imbler still provides
the standard against which prosecutorial immunity cases are
judged, and courts are advised to consider Imbler as well as Ka-
lina in considering whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity.
Anne H. Burkett
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